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(p. 270). The American college at Beyrout is simply called the Protestant College instead of the Syrian Protestant College. In an extensive index of twenty-seven pages as important a subject as "mass movements" has no place. No bibliography is given.

No leader in missions can afford to omit the reading of this volume; it should be in every mission library and it will undoubtedly find large use as a text or reference book among the growing number of classes in colleges and seminaries taking up the serious study of the history of missions.

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THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE¹

As the page numbers indicate, this volume is no hurried publication of half-digested views, a practice which has become too much the fashion in philosophy. From hints in the preface and elsewhere, one gathers that this is the first of a possible series of volumes that is to set forth a system of philosophy of religion. In these days of rapid reconstruction and of tentative and timid philosophizing, it is interesting to find some one with courage to project a system.

Also, at a time when epistemology is despised and rejected of philosophy, it is refreshing to see a volume frankly devoted to this outcast subject. I say "frankly," for there is a large amount of philosophical writing which, while professing to have renounced epistemology and all its works, is yet forced by its presuppositions to speak throughout with the voice of epistemology. But Professor Macintosh is a well-oriented writer. He knows what he is about. He is fully aware of his premises. He sees clearly, as many do not, that if one starts with the metaphysical premises of a world of purely "psychical subjects" and acts on the one hand and "physical objects" and acts on the other, there is no escape from epistemology. It is not to be got rid of by dropping the name or by calling it "logic." Professor Macintosh is equally successful in showing that the epistemological problem is neither solved nor shelved by the various metaphysical devices of the idealistic movement, nor by the "logistics" of neo-realism. And here perhaps is the place to say that one of the most valuable features of the volume is the expository and critical survey of current theories of knowledge which it furnishes.

¹ *The Problem of Knowledge*. By Douglas Clyde Macintosh, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Theology, Yale University. New York: Macmillan, 1915. xviii+503 pages. \$3.00.

However, it is noticeable that the conception of the problem of knowledge as the presentation to, or the representation by, a "psychical subject" of a "physical object" makes very difficult a successful exposition of those views of knowledge—e.g., the experimental conception of knowledge of the pragmatic movement—which are based on the explicit rejection of the metaphysical dualism of the psychical and physical. Doubtless this is the besetting sin of all criticism—the substitution of the critic's premises for those of the theory he is discussing, and the assumption that the problem is the same for the critic and his victim. So in this volume, I think, many of the difficulties and inadequacies which are found in some pragmatic theories of truth and error are due to the assumption that the theories discussed start from the same conception of what makes knowledge a problem as that of the author, viz., the dualism of "psychical subject" and "physical object." But in the pragmatic theory of knowledge, as the reviewer understands it, this dualism is not only irrelevant but malevolent. Failure to keep this in mind is responsible for what will appear to some as the grotesque characterization of Professor Dewey's theory of knowledge as "disguised psychological idealism" in which all conscious experience is regarded as "subjective, as *my* sensations, *my* feelings, *my* ideas" (p. 118)!

For the author the "problem of knowledge" falls into two phases which determine the two main divisions of the volume: the problem of immediate, i.e., perceptive, presentative knowing; and the problem of mediate, representative knowing. The general doctrine which includes the solution for both these phases is called "critical realistic epistemological monism," whose thesis is that the object as known is "numerically identical" with the "real object" at the moment of knowing. From the reviewer's standpoint there is no doubt that if we are to escape agnosticism we must, as Professor Macintosh insists, be realists in some sense. Knowing must succeed in its work. But whether its work is presentation of a "physical object" to a "psychical subject," or the representation by a "psychical subject" of a "physical object," and whether if that be its mark it can succeed, is another matter.

Some readers are sure to find that the doctrine of epistemological monism is more easily applied to presentation than to representation. In the latter, the representing factor is "never identical with its object, *except for practical purposes.*" Just how does "numerical identity" apply here?

For a presentative-representative theory of knowledge the crisis of the argument comes in dealing with truth and error. And the difficulties are not lessened when the theory is cast in the form of epistemological

monism. If the presentation or representation must be "numerically identical" with the "real object," how is there to be misrepresentation or misrepresentation? And what is to distinguish a true from a false presentation or representation? Here pragmatism is a present help. But it is a serious question whether we can find salvation in pragmatism if we still cling to a psychical-physical metaphysics and to a presentative-representative conception of the essential nature and function of knowledge.

The difficulty in a presentative-representative pragmatism is to avoid the same sort of circular regress which appears in "purposive or voluntaristic intellectualism" of the Roycean type, in which knowing is true when it fulfils its purpose—its purpose being to know! Professor Macintosh mercilessly exposes this procedure. Yet when he reaches his own final statement of verification (p. 453), he finds it in immediate presentation, i.e., in immediate *knowledge*. Thus the appeal to "practice" ends in an appeal to another form of knowledge.

Strictly taken, this solution of the problem of verification makes immediate knowing infallible. Professor Macintosh sees this, but is able to dispose of it only by the Kantian utterance that "intuitions [presentations] without concepts [representations] are blind." But if presentations are "blind" and representations are uncertain (because they also are somewhat blind?), how can either verify the other?

There are indeed passages in which the verifying experience appears to be, not an immediate presentation, but a kind of conduct which involves a great deal more than presentation; and, in so far as knowing becomes a real part of such conduct, it also must be something more than presentation and representation. If it is not, it cannot make a detailed and continuous connection with practice, and its appeal to practice for verification is external and in vain. If we ignore conduct in our account of the origin and function of knowledge, we cannot appeal to it when we face the problem of truth and error. To such an appeal it will say: "Depart from me, ye workers of magic, I never knew you."

But no one has made a better case from his premises than Professor Macintosh. His discussion is everywhere well considered and courageous. He is aware at every turn of the difficulties and faces them squarely. Any failure to dispose of them must be charged, not to lack of skill in the course of the treatment, but to the limitations of the presuppositions—especially the metaphysical disjunction of the psychical and physical—with which the treatment starts.

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